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The average investor reaction is neutral to primary offerings by firms with managerial incentives 
closely tied to the shareholder value. Investors react negatively (1) when there are insufficient 
managerial ownership stakes to deter misuse of SEO proceeds and (2) when there are negative 
signals transmitted through secondary offerings by insiders and block-holders. Consistent with an 
agency-based explanation, firms engaging in value-destroying corporate acquisitions suffer large 
negative returns at the announcement of SEOs. Agency problems seem to be of less concern to 
investors, however, when firms are subject to intense monitoring by institutional investors and the 
market for corporate control. Overall, our findings demonstrate that controlling agency problems, 
an important facet of corporate governance, has a significant effect on firm valuation and the cost 
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It is well documented that investors react negatively to announcements of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO).2 There are three explanations offered for the negative reaction. One is the Leland 
and Pyle (1977) signaling effect: Sales of shares by better-informed investors signal that they 
believe shares are overpriced. Another, the Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection problem, 
goes beyond the pure signaling effect: It does not require insiders selling their personal 
shareholdings to transmit a negative signal. The mere act of issuing equity conveys a negative 
signal about the true value of the firm that leads to suboptimal investment decisions. The dead-
weight loss due to suboptimal investments adds extra cost to equity financing and, hence, makes it 
the financing choice of last resort, providing a theoretical base for Myers’ (1984) pecking order 
theory.  
A third explanation, theoretically formalized by Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996), is agency 
problems. When managerial self-interests are misaligned with shareholder value maximization, 
managers may pursue value-destroying growth strategies when there are no positive NPV 
investment opportunities, increasing their private benefits of control at the expense of 
shareholders. Investors’ awareness of such potential misuse of funds raised in equity offerings 
causes the negative reaction. 
All these explanations are plausible. But there is substantial variation in investor reaction 
across SEOs. How significant is each of the three effects--signaling, adverse selection, and 
agency—in explaining the variation? If they jointly influence investor reaction, can we disentangle 
them and assess their relative importance? These issues are important not only to better understand 
investor behavior but also to learn the key drivers affecting the cost of raising external equity 
capital and firm valuation.  
                                                 
2 See Asquith and Mullins (1986); Masulis and Korwar (1986); Mikkelson and Partch (1986); Smith (1986); 
Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991); Denis (1994); Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996); and Chemmanur and Jiao 
(2005); among others. 
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This paper attempts an empirical assessment of the relative importance of the three 
theoretical explanations for the negative investor reaction. It also investigates the circumstances 
under which they affect and interact in pricing newly issued shares. We do so by providing a 
comprehensive treatment of agency considerations and by isolating price reaction to sales of 
personal shareholdings of insiders and block-holders through secondary offerings, which are often 
made as a part of SEOs.  
Three variables are used to proxy agency problems; managerial incentives to enhance 
shareholder value, external pressures to contain agency costs, and managerial actions around SEOs 
indicative of the extent of agency problems. For managerial incentives, we estimate how closely 
top management’s self-interests are tied to shareholder value by measuring the sensitivity of the 
value of top managers’ equity stakes (stocks and stock options) to changes in stock price. This 
sensitivity, hereafter referred as “equity incentives”, is measured by following Core and Guay 
(1999). The agency based explanation predicts a positive relation between equity incentives and 
investor reaction to SEOs. 
Equity incentives may also be related to external pressures in place to contain agency costs. 
Principal-agent models suggest that when the agent’s actions can be easily monitored, firms should 
rely less on costly incentive contracts (Prendergast (2002)).3 Hence, equity incentives may play a 
less important role when there are more external pressures on management to make value-
maximizing decisions. In a study of firm-level external pressures, Cremers and Nair (2005) 
investigate the interaction between monitoring by institutional investors and pressure from the 
market for corporate control. They find the two external pressures are complements. Therefore, we 
                                                 
3 Incentive contracts in the form of equity grants are costly because managers are risk-averse and hence demand a risk-
premium to compensate for insufficient diversification. 
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examine how equity incentives interact with external monitoring and with vulnerability to takeover 
threats in affecting investor reaction to SEOs. 
Among the various managerial actions taking place around SEOs, we choose corporate 
acquisitions as an ex-post proxy for agency problems. In a recent study, Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2006) find that corporate governance and the profitability of acquisitions are positively related, 
implying that firms with undeterred agency problems are more likely to engage in acquisitions 
harmful to shareholders. Thus, when a firm engages in value-destroying acquisitions around its 
SEO, we expect investors to react more negatively to the SEO announcement. 
We distinguish the Leland and Pyle type signaling effect from the Myers and Majluf 
adverse selection by using secondary offerings. Unlike primary offerings of newly issued shares 
that provide funds to the issuing firm, secondary offerings are shares sold by corporate insiders and 
block-holders. Because the proceeds do not go to the firm, secondary offerings per se cannot lead 
to suboptimal investment decisions associated with either the adverse selection or the agency 
problem. We isolate the pure signaling effect by controlling for the presence of secondary 
offerings in regressions. We then attempt to explain the remaining price reaction to SEOs with 
proxies for adverse selection and agency problems. 
Our investigation identifies two main reasons for negative reactions to SEOs: (a) negative 
signals through secondary offerings and (b) the misalignment of managerial self-interests with 
those of shareholders. When managerial self-interests are closely aligned with shareholder value, 
the average investor reaction is positive, albeit insignificant, for a five-day window surrounding 
SEOs without secondary offerings. Apparently, the mere act of SEOs conveys no negative signal. 
Our regression estimates suggest that one standard deviation increase in equity incentives 
leads to an increase of about 0.9% in SEO announcement returns. When secondary offerings are 
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present, the average price reaction drops by -2.3% relative to pure-primary issues. These results are 
robust to industry- and year fixed effects. Further, our analysis of long-term returns (over a five-
year period) shows that the market’s discriminating response to equity incentives is timely without 
any prolonged effect. Our long-term results are also consistent with the findings of Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli (2000) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998).4 
When we relate equity incentives to external pressures from institutional investors and the 
market for corporate control, equity incentives significantly explain SEO announcement returns 
only for firms not subject to intense external monitoring by public pension funds, block-holders, or 
the market for corporate control. This confirms the hypothesis that costly internal incentive 
contracts are substitutes for external monitoring. 
Our results using value destroying acquisitions as an ex-post proxy for agency problems are 
also consistent with the agency based explanation. When SEO firms make acquisitions with 
announcement returns below -1%, they experience an investor reaction of about -3% at the time of 
SEO announcements relative to non-acquiring firms. The results are robust to alternative 
definitions of value-destroying acquisitions. 
As for the information based explanations, the negative investor reaction to secondary 
offerings is consistent with the pure signaling hypothesis. This negative reaction cannot be 
attributed to the Myers and Majluf adverse selection, because the proceeds are not subject to 
managerial discretion. Agency problems, though, can explain partly the negative reaction because 
secondary offerings may reduce managerial equity stakes and block ownership concentration, 
making investors more concerned with misalignment of manager-shareholder interests and with 
the diminished monitoring by block-holders and institutional investors.  
                                                 
4 Eckbo et al. demonstrate how  the drop in leverage following equity issuance explains the long-run SEO 
underperformance. Teoh et al. document a long-run underperformance for firms with high accruals. 
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To identify the effect of the adverse selection problem, we control for secondary offerings 
to remove the pure signaling effect. We then relate the SEO announcement return to various 
proxies for the degree of information asymmetry surrounding the issuing firm based on previous 
studies, as well as to proxies for the variables that Myers and Majluf argue relax the adverse 
selection problem. We find none of the proxies is significantly related to the investor reaction.  
There are two possible explanations for this negative finding. One is the Dybvig and 
Zender (1991) proposition that the Myers and Majluf adverse selection problem disappears when 
shareholders choose a managerial compensation policy that maximizes the ex-ante market value of 
the firm. This theoretical explanation gets a further boost from our finding of the neutral investor 
reaction to pure primary offerings by high equity incentive firms, which also is inconsistent with 
the prediction of the Myers and Majluf model that the mere act of issuing equity conveys a 
negative signal regardless of the level of equity incentives.5 
The other explanation is the potential large firm bias in our sample. The necessary data to 
compute equity incentives are available only for S&P 1500 firms, which has more or less equal 
representation of large, mid, and small cap firms--S&P 500 (large cap), S&P 400 (mid cap) and 
                                                 
5 Myers and Majluf assume that managers always act in the best interests of the old shareholders and, hence, provide 
no prediction on the relation between the market reaction and equity incentives. In a recent study, Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2005) allow for divergent self-interests between managers and old shareholders in Myers and 
Majluf’s framework and argue that the more aligned managerial incentive is to shareholder value, the more likely 
management is to issue overvalued equity to benefit old shareholders, exacerbating the adverse selection problem for 
other investors. Thus they predict that firms with better aligned shareholder-manager interests will receive more 
negative reaction to SEOs. As evidence in support of this rather counter-intuitive prediction, Datta et al. present a 
negative relation between the price reaction and stock options granted during the previous fiscal year. This use of stock 
options as a proxy for equity incentives is misleading and inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, Core and Guay 
(1999) demonstrate that the new grants represent partial adjustments toward the optimal level, and hence, new grants 
of stock options reflect deviations from the target incentive level and do not measure the alignment of manager-
shareholder interests. Second, new grants of stock options represent only a fraction of total managerial equity 
incentives and ignore other equity incentives such as stock grants. Third, our analysis indicates that compared to stock 
grants, options are much less effective in aligning interests between managers and shareholders. In contrast to Datta et 
al., our measure of equity incentives is based on all managerial holdings of both stocks and stock options. 
Interestingly, our measure of equity incentives is negatively correlated with Datta et al.’s estimate of new option grants 
during their sample period. This negative correlation is consistent with Core and Guay’s findings that firms with lower 
(higher) levels of equity incentives than optimal are more likely to increase (decrease) new grants of stock options in 
the following year. 
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S&P 600 (small cap) indices. Perhaps a sample of small firms with better proxies for the adverse 
selection may provide more supportive results. 
 The large firm bias may also affect our results concerning the agency hypothesis. The 
separation of ownership and control, which is the root cause of agency problems, is more prevalent 
among larger firms, making equity incentives more relevant. To the extent that smaller firms are 
more closely owned, however, our measure of equity incentive would be higher (had the data on 
equity incentives been available). We investigate this issue by using the Heckman (1979) two-step 
selection model in the robustness section. The results are robust to sample selection bias. 
Our study also yields an interesting byproduct: Among the different components of the 
equity incentive, managerial stock ownership seems to matter most. Stock holdings have 
significant positive impact on investor reaction to SEOs, whereas the effect of stock options is 
negligible. Within stock ownership, the non-restricted portion has much greater impact than the 
restricted portion. Although providing an in-depth theoretical explanation is beyond the scope of 
this paper, one possible interpretation is that investors consider vested stocks most effective in 
aligning manager-shareholder interests because (1) they represent current managerial ownership of 
the firm and (2) vested stocks are the easiest for investors to value and understand.6 We repeat our 
regression estimation only with the percentage of vested stocks owned by top managers. The 
results are similar to those with the equity incentive variable with all three components in it.  
This paper is closely related to Jung et al. (1996), who are the first to formally demonstrate 
the role of agency problems in security issuance decisions. For lack of a better proxy, Jung et al. 
                                                 
6 For restricted stocks, there are uncertainties over actual ownership of the shares because of the possible inability to 
clear the restrictions or of executives leaving the company prior to the expiration of the vesting period. Eventual 
conversion of options into stocks is also subject to uncertainty because of stock price volatility and the vesting 
requirements. In addition, the stock price of vested stocks is readily observable in the market, whereas valuation of 
executive stock options requires a number of assumptions of which investors may have difficulty understanding the 
ramifications. 
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use the market-to-book (MB) value ratio as the measure of agency problems. They reason that 
because low MB ratios imply low growth opportunities, investors are more concerned with misuse 
of the proceeds when low growth firms issue equity. Their data show a positive relation between 
MB ratios and investor reaction, i.e., more negative investor reaction when SEOs are made by low 
growth firms. As Jung et al. acknowledge, however, this relation can be explained by both the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection problem and agency problems.7 
Moreover, the extent of agency problems may not be inversely related to growth 
opportunities, as Jung et al. assume. For example, the “quiet life” hypothesis of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) suggests that firms with high-growth opportunities may suffer more agency 
problems than low-growth firms. Bertrand and Mullainathan present convincing evidence that 
managers’ desire for a quiet life discourages corporate investments. Managers who prefer a quiet 
life to aggressively pursuing profitable investments will devote less effort to convert growth 
options into real assets. Because high-growth firms have more growth options, such managerial 
shirking may have more negative impact on high-growth firms than on low-growth firms. If 
investors believe the quiet life problem is prevalent, as Bertrand and Mullainathan’s finding 
suggest, investors might be more concerned with improper use of SEO proceeds by high MB ratio 
firms than by low MB ratio firms.  
                                                 
7Jung et al. state, “As modified by Cooney and Kalay (1993), the Myers and Majluf model can explain that high-
growth firms issuing equity would have a more positive stock price reaction than low-growth firms. Hence, relating 
the stock price reaction to investment opportunities is not sufficient to make the case for the agency model of security 
issues” (p. 165). Cooney and Kalay extend the Myers and Majluf model by allowing for negative NPV projects and 
demonstrate that the decision to issue equity could signal an exceptionally valuable project, leading to a positive 
market reaction. Thus, if issuing equity by high market-to-book firms signals good capital expenditure opportunities, 
SEO announcement day returns are likely to be positively related to market-to-book ratio. Indeed, McConnell and 
Muscarella (1985) document positive market reactions to announcements of various corporate capital expenditure 
decisions.  
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Unlike the MB ratio, our measure of equity incentives circumvents the quiet life issue to 
the extent that monetary incentives motivate managers. It also enables us to separate the effect of 
suboptimal investments due to agency problems from those due to the adverse selection problem. 
 The use of equity incentives as a proxy for (the inverse of) the agency problem is not free 
from endogeneity, however. Since equity incentives reflect the accumulation of stocks and options 
granted to managers as antidotes to agency problems, one may argue that firms have higher equity 
incentives because they are more prone to agency problems. We explicitly address this issue in the 
robustness section by using the Core and Guay model to estimate deviations from a customary 
level of incentives given firm characteristics. The deviations are used to analyze the relation 
between equity incentives and SEO announcement returns. The results are statistically and 
economically robust to this alternative specification.  
We also address the omitted variables bias by modeling equity incentives and investor 
reaction as endogenous variables in a two-stage regression framework. The results are robust to 
using the predicted value of incentives. Finally, data on firm operating performance show that SEO 
firms with higher equity incentives utilize corporate resources more profitably and efficiently. This 
is comforting for our use of equity incentives because investors should be less worried about 
misuse of SEO proceeds when firms have more profitable and efficient operations.  
The next section describes the data and the sample construction. Empirical results and a 
battery of robustness checks follow in Section II. Section III contains concluding remarks. 
I. Data and sample construction 
 We obtain data from multiple sources. Data on SEOs are obtained from the Thompson 
Financial’s SDC database; executive compensation data are obtained from the Executive 
Compensation Database of COMPUSTAT; and accounting and stock return data are obtained from 
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COMPUSTAT (both active and research) and CRSP, respectively. Because the Executive 
Compensation Database began compiling data for S&P 1500 firms in 1994, we start our sample of 
SEOs from that year.8 We obtain corporate acquisitions data from SDC’s M&A database; 
institutional and block-holdings from 13-F filings; and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) 
governance measure from Wharton Research Data Services. 
Our sample of SEOs covers the period 1994-2003. We classify SEOs into pure primary, 
pure secondary, and mixed issues.9 We exclude REITs, ADRs, and Units. We also remove 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes between 4910-4940) to 
conform to earlier studies.10  Finally, we remove firms with less than $1 in offer price to prevent 
bid-ask bounce from dominating the results.  
The remaining firms are intersected with the CRSP and COMPUSTAT Executive 
Compensation databases. We require that the Executive Compensation database reports sufficient 
compensation details of the CEO and other top four executives of the firm such that it is possible 
to compute the ‘equity incentive’ measure described in the Appendix. To ensure that our statistical 
inferences are not influenced by firms with multiple SEOs in the same year, we restrict to only one 
SEO per firm per year, which removes 10 observations from the sample. These filters produce a 
final sample of 597 firms over a period of 10 years. Of these, 361 are pure primary offerings, 140 
pure secondary, and 96 mixed.  
                                                 
8 For a smaller sample of firms (S&P 500), COMPUSTAT also back-filled the information for 1992 and 1993. To 
ensure that we obtain compensation data as of the fiscal year prior to the SEO date and to avoid any data back-filling 
biases, we start our SEO sample in 1994. Our results are similar (with slightly stronger results for key variables of 
interest) when we include SEOs (16) from these earlier periods.  
9 Many SEOs in the SDC database have missing values for the primary shares offered. We take these SEOs as having 
zero primary shares. Our reading of over 20 10-Ks suggests that these missing codes should have been zero and they 
have been wrongly classified as missing by the SDC.  
10 These firms are removed because they often have specific reasons to issue SEOs. For example, banks often issue 
equity to meet regulatory capital requirements, while utilities may issue equity as a part of a gaming process with the 
regulators. 
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The SDC database provides only the filing-date of SEOs, which may not coincide with the 
announcement date. We start with the filing date as the base and search for any news item in the 
past month concerning the firm’s plan to issue equity. We search all publications covered by 
Factiva, which includes the Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Retrieval. If we find any 
mention of a firm’s plan to raise equity in an SEO, we consider that day as the announcement day; 
otherwise, we consider the filing date as the announcement day. 11 There are 28 cases where the 
announcement date differs from the filing date. 
A.  Summary Statistics 
 Table IA provides the yearly distribution of SEOs in our sample. Panel A provides statistics 
for all 597 firms, Panel B is restricted to pure primary and mixed offerings, Panel C to pure 
primary SEOs, and Panel D to pure secondary SEOs. The sample is fairly evenly spread over the 
ten-year period. For the total sample, the median (mean) offer price is $31 ($37) and the median 
(mean) firm raised about $130 million ($250 million). In the fiscal year ended just before the SEO, 
our sample firms have median (mean) sales of $634 million ($2,670 million). These numbers 
suggest that our sample indeed contains relatively large firms.  
The proceeds raised in the offering represent about 13% (18%) of the equity value for the 
median (mean) firm based on the pre-issue market capitalization. This represents a significant 
portion of the firm value and therefore the SEOs represent important events for the sample firms. 
The corresponding numbers in Panels B and C indicate that these characteristics are roughly 
similar for all three samples. Panel D, however, shows that pure secondary issues involve larger 
firms with larger offerings, but proceeds as a percentage of market capitalization are smaller than 
our overall sample. 
                                                 
11 Empirical studies on SEOs often use the filing date as the announcement day (e.g., Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch 
(1993), Denis (1994), and Datta et al. (2005)). 
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Table IA also shows the yearly distribution of mean and median cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) during (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) event windows surrounding the announcement date. The 
return on the value-weighted market index of CRSP is subtracted from the raw return of the 
issuing firm to obtain CARs. We include day +2 in the second window for two reasons. First, for 
some SEOs the filing information may not reach the market until day +1. Second, investors may 
disagree about the valuation implications of the SEO announcement. When investors’ primary 
concern is about management’s intended use of the proceeds, it may take longer for the market to 
reach consensus because additional information may be released subsequent to the SEO 
announcement. For example, there was considerable uncertainty about Google’s intended use of 
the proceeds when it first announced an SEO on August 18, 2005.12  
The CARs indicate that the average investor reactions to SEOs are -1.48% and -1.33% 
around the (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) windows, respectively. These numbers are statistically 
significantly different from zero. Datta et al. (2005) report a similar magnitude of stock price 
reaction around the filing date for SEOs during the period 1993-1999. 
When we compare the announcement day returns in Panel D (pure secondary issues) with 
those in Panels A, B, and C, a clear pattern emerges. The market reacts more negatively when 
SEOs contain secondary offerings. For the pure primary subsample, the mean returns around (-2, 
+1) and (-2, +2) windows are -1.04% and -0.72%, respectively. These are higher than those for 
pure secondary issues, which are -1.55% and -1.76% for (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) windows, 
respectively. The difference is larger for median returns, which are more robust to outliers than the 
mean. 
                                                 
12 According to an article in Forbes.com (2005), “…Google said on Thursday that it has submitted a U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission filing to issue 14.1 million common shares. The total offering is valued at approximately 
$4 billion…Merrill Lynch reiterated a ‘neutral’ rating on Google, saying the stock will likely be range-bound until 
investors have more information regarding the use of the proceeds of the offering.” (Italics added for emphasis.) 
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B. Measure of Equity Incentive 
 To measure managers’ equity incentives we follow Core and Guay (1999) and construct the 
‘Delta’ of the firm’s top managers (see the Appendix). Delta measures the sensitivity of the value 
of the managers’ shareholdings and stock options to a 1% change in the firm’s stock price. Thus, 
Delta captures the manager’s incentive to increase the stock price and proxies for the alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders. The Delta of stockholdings is simply given by 1% of 
the value of manager’s stockholdings (i.e., number of stocks held by the manager multiplied by the 
stock price), while the Delta of stock options are computed using the Black-Scholes model as 
modified by Core and Guay.  
We measure the managerial equity incentive prior to the equity issuance by using the most 
recent fiscal yearend data before the SEO announcement. The Executive Compensation database 
provides compensation details for the top five managers. Because SEO decisions may involve a 
team of top managers, we include the incentives of all five managers. In unreported results, we 
also experiment with an alternative specification where we use the incentives of only the CEOs 
and CFOs and obtain similar results. 
Table IB shows the descriptive statistics for the compensation variable. Similar to earlier 
studies, we find considerable skewness in various compensation measures. To remove this 
skewness bias, we employ a log transform. Panel A shows that the median CEO of our overall 
sample earns total annual compensation of about $1.8 million, which includes salary, bonus, value 
of restricted stocks granted, Black-Scholes value of the options granted, and various miscellaneous 
items such as insurance and housing benefits. Total compensation does not include the gains 
executives realize from exercising existing options or proceeds from selling preexisting stocks. For 
the median firm, the top five managers’ total annual compensation amounts to $5.3 million. These 
 14  
numbers are fairly similar across the three samples, again with the exception of secondary 
offerings which show greater compensation because of larger firm size. 
Delta is the key variable. The median CEO for the total sample has a Delta of $250,000, 
which is the amount the median CEO stands to lose if the stock price falls by 1%. For each firm, 
we compute the ratio of Delta to total compensation. The median Delta/Total ratio for CEO for the 
overall sample is 0.10. Thus if the stock price falls by 1%, the CEO loses about 10% of her yearly 
income. For the top five managers, we first sum their Deltas and then divide by the sum of their 
total compensation to obtain the Delta/Total ratio. Taken together, the top five managers of the 
median firm stand to lose $544,000 when the stock price falls by 1%, representing about 8% of 
their combined annual earnings. Most of our analysis uses the (log transform of) Delta/Total ratio 
of the top five managers as the key explanatory variable. In the robustness section we use 
alternative measures of the incentives such as (a) percentage ownership held by the top five 
managers and (b) log (Delta/Sum of Salary and Bonus Only). The key results are robust. 
II. Empirical Results 
A. Univariate Tests 
 We start with a univariate analysis of announcement day returns across various incentive 
groups. For each year, we break SEOs into four groups based on the log (Delta/Total) ratio of the 
top five managers, to ensure that our results are not biased by any time trend in the equity incentive 
grants.13 Returns are computed for the event windows of (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) days around the 
announcement date. The mean CARs across the four groups are reported in Table II.  
Panel A reports CARs for all SEOs. Firms with highest equity incentives outperform 
lowest incentive firms by an economically meaningful margin of 1.52% to 1.44%. This difference 
                                                 
13 We also conduct an analysis by pooling all sample SEOs and then dividing firms into four groups. Our results are 
similar. 
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in returns is statistically significant at the 5% level; furthermore, the returns across the four groups 
are almost monotonic. While the CARs for the lowest incentive group are significantly negative (at 
the 2% level or better), the highest incentive group’s CARs are statistically zero. The negative 
announcement day return is concentrated in sub samples of low incentive firms. The patterns for 
median return are similar (unreported).  
In Panel B we exclude SEOs that are pure secondary issues, leaving only the pure primary 
and mixed offerings. Without pure secondary issues, the wedge between highest and lowest 
incentive groups increases to 1.98% and 2.02% for (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) day window, respectively. 
The concentration of negative reactions to firms with low equity incentives indicates that investors 
worry about SEOs when managerial self-interests are not closely aligned with shareholder value. 
When we focus on only pure primary offerings in Panel C, the results are striking. There is 
no hint of negative market reactions for the high incentive group in this subsample. For the (-2, +2) 
day window, the high incentive group’s CAR is actually positive, albeit insignificant.  This result 
is inconsistent with Myers and Majluf’s adverse selection, which predicts a negative market 
reaction regardless of the level of equity incentives.  
Panel D shows the results for pure secondary issues. In contrast to other panels, there is no 
correlation between incentives and announcement day returns. Because no funds are raised that 
can be mismanaged, investors do not seem to pay attention to how well managerial interests are 
aligned with those of shareholders. Investors’ main concern seems to be the negative signals 
transmitted from the actions of informed investors. 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the two important factors affecting investor reactions to 
SEO announcements are agency costs and sale of shares by informed investors. The evidence 
concerning pure primary issues is inconsistent with adverse selection ala Myers and Majluf. 
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B. Multivariate Tests 
1.  Control variables  
We first control for the pure signaling effect with a dummy variable that equals one if the 
issue contains secondary offerings, and zero otherwise.14 We then relate SEO announcement 
returns to agency and adverse selection problems. The equity incentive of the top five managers is 
the proxy for (the inverse of) agency problems.  
An ideal proxy for adverse selections is hard to find. Earlier studies have used the size of a 
firm as a proxy for asymmetric information with the presumption that larger firms are under 
greater scrutiny by the investors and are more actively followed by analysts. We include log (sales) 
of the firm as a proxy for a firm’s size. We expect to see a positive coefficient on this variable. 
Another proxy used by previous researchers is the standard deviation of market-model regression 
residuals (Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson (1985)). Assuming that investors and managers are 
symmetrically informed about systematic factors affecting firm value, the residual volatility may 
be used as a proxy for information asymmetry about firm-specific information. To compute this 
measure, daily stock returns are regressed on the value-weighted market return for a one-year 
period ending 30 days before the SEO announcement and then we take the standard deviation of 
residual as an information asymmetry proxy. We also control for the number of analysts following 
the company’s stock as yet another proxy for asymmetric information. We take log (1 + number of 
analysts) as the explanatory variable to remove the skewness and to ensure that firms with zero 
analysts are also included.   
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the financial slack relaxes the adverse selection 
problem. We control for this effect by including a firm’s cash and cash equivalents normalized by 
                                                 
14 We also estimate our model with the fraction of secondary shares instead of a dummy variable, and obtain similar 
results. Further, we collect data on insider sales of shares from the firms’ prospectus. Controlling for insider sales 
produces similar results. 
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its assets. This variable may also proxy for agency costs associated with free cash flows. 
Korajczyk et al. (1991) use a time-varying proxy for adverse selection costs based on whether firm 
issues equity before or after the earnings announcement. In unreported analysis, we also include a 
dummy variable in our regressions that takes a value of one if the firm issues equity immediately 
after its earnings release to the market, and zero otherwise. We do not report results of this 
specification because the results do not change. 
Jung et al. (1996) argue that SEO announcement returns are positively related to growth 
opportunities, which they measure with the market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q). We include it as a 
control variable. We also use analysts’ consensus growth forecasts as the proxy for growth 
opportunities. Because MB ratios and analysts’ consensus forecasts are highly correlated and 
because they produce similar results, we only report results with MB ratios.  
Lucas and McDonald (1990) and Jung et al. (1996) use firms’ past returns as a proxy for 
the availability of good projects. We control for this effect by including the firm’s log (1 + buy and 
hold return) over the past twelve months before SEO filing. This variable also may stand as a 
proxy for overvaluation because the market timing literature suggests that firms issue shares when 
stocks are overvalued (see Loughran and Ritter (1995), Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995), and 
Stein (1996)). To the extent managers are more likely to issue equity when stock prices are high, 
this variable controls for such timing behavior. 
Financial leverage is also used as a control variable, where leverage is defined as the sum 
of long-term and short-term debt normalized by the book value of assets. High leverage may 
control the agency cost of free cash flows. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that leverage 
restricts management’s discretion and reduces agency costs; hence, outside investors may be less 
concerned with the misuse of funds when firms are highly leveraged.  
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Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find that equity issuing firms tend to raise reported 
earnings by increasing accruals in the pre-issue period. They also show that high-accrual issuers 
underperform low-accrual issuers in the long run. We control for the accrual, defined as the net 
income minus cash flow from operations scaled by the total assets. We expect to find a negative 
coefficient on this variable. Finally, we control for the amount raised in the SEO as a fraction of 
the pre-issue market value of the firm, because Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that this variable 
affects SEO announcement day returns.  
For the remainder of this paper we use only the sample of pure primary and mixed 
offerings (457 SEOs). In unreported analysis, we include pure secondary issues and find our main 
results remain robust as long as we control for secondary offerings with a dummy variable. 
Table III contains summary statistics for the control variables. All accounting variables are 
measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the equity issuance. The other variables are 
measured either one month or one quarter before the SEO filing. The variable of main interest, 
Delta, is significantly and positively correlated with market-to-book ratio, secondary issue dummy 
and growth, confirming the need to include them as control variables to avoid spurious correlation.  
2. Results 
 The dependent variable in all regressions is the return during the (-2, +2) window for 
reasons discussed earlier. Regression analyses are repeated with other event windows and the 
results are not sensitive to the choice of this window. We estimate regressions with industry and 
year dummies, where industry dummies are based on two-digit SIC codes.15 There are several 
reasons to control for industry- and year fixed effects. Equity incentives may vary across industries 
                                                 
15 In our sample, there are eight two-digit industries with only one SEO each. We collapse these eight industries to a 
miscellaneous two-digit SIC code.  
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for reasons such as industry-specific growth characteristics and competitiveness in both the 
product and the labor market. The control variables such as market-to-book ratio and leverage also 
exhibit industry-specific variations (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1983)). Furthermore, there is a 
well-documented time trend in equity incentive awards to the top executives (Murphy (1999)). Our 
goal is to understand the effect of equity incentives independent of such industry- and time-
specific factors.  
Table IV presents results for three different models based on various combinations of the 
explanatory variables. In Model 1, our base model, only two variables significantly explain the 
market reaction; equity incentives of the top managers and whether the SEO contains a secondary 
offering.16 The market discriminates between firms with high- and low managerial equity 
incentives. At the same time, the market is concerned about the sale of securities by large 
shareholders and insiders, resulting in lower returns with secondary offerings. In economic terms, 
a standard deviation increase in the equity incentive leads to an increase of about 0.9% in 
announcement day returns. The presence of secondary offerings leads to about -2.3% relative to 
pure primary issues.  
The coefficients on firm size (sales) and standard deviation of market model residual, our 
proxies for information asymmetry, are insignificant in all specifications. The coefficient on the 
number of analysts covering the firm (in Model 3) is also insignificant. In unreported analysis, we 
also use other proxies for information asymmetry such as the ‘probability of information based 
trade’ measure of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) and divergence in analysts’ earnings 
estimate. Neither of these proxies helps explain SEO announcement returns. The coefficient on 
                                                 
16 The market-to-book ratio is insignificant in both Models 1 and 3. To check if the insignificance is due to the 
correlation with equity incentives, we drop the equity incentive variable in Model 2, where the ratio still remains 
insignificant. The MB ratio becomes positive and significant when we duplicate Jung et al.’s sample and model 
specifications--i.e., (-1, 0) window for only pure primary issues without SEO firm’s past return as a control variable. 
Even under these specifications, the MB ratio becomes insignificant in we include equity incentives. 
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cash, our proxy for financial slack, which Myers and Majluf argue helps control the adverse 
selection problem, is not significant in any of the regressions.  
In sum, our results provide strong support for the agency cost based explanation and the 
pure signaling effect. However, none of the six proxies that would have given credence to the 
adverse selection problem helps explain investor reaction.  
3. Value-destroying corporate acquisitions as a proxy for agency problems  
Equity incentives may be viewed as an ex-ante measure to control agency problems. In this 
section, we use an ex-post proxy for agency problems: incidences of misuse of corporate 
resources. We choose the most visible case of corporate investments – acquisitions of other firms. 
From the SDC US domestic M&A database, we obtain all acquisitions made by our SEO firms 
during the one year (+/- six months) and six-month (+/- three months) period surrounding the SEO 
announcement, as well as during the six month period following the announcement. The agency 
hypothesis suggests that investors should be wary of providing funds to firms with a history of bad 
acquisitions. Therefore, we look at the recent past to capture this effect. The market also can 
anticipate rationally the most likely use of these funds; hence, we include acquisitions made soon 
after the SEO announcement. 
We follow the standard approach used in M&A literature to put filters on this sample. Our 
sample selection criteria for acquisitions are the same as Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). 
We require: (a) the deal is completed, (b) the target is a domestic US firm, (c) the acquiring firm 
has less than 50% of the target’s outstanding shares before the deal and acquires the entire shares 
outstanding, and (d) the deal value is more than $1 million. We also require that the deal value is at 
least 5% of the acquirer size (measured by the book value of its assets).  
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In our sample, 149 (94) SEO firms acquired other firms during a +/- six-month (three-
month) period surrounding their equity issuance. Panel A of Table V shows positive mean and 
median returns of 2.99% and 2.09 % for the +/- six-month period in a (-2, +2) day event-window 
surrounding the M&A announcement.17 The magnitudes of these returns are comparable to 
Moeller et al. who report a mean abnormal return of 1.1% in the (-1, +1) day event window 
surrounding the acquisition announcement for over 12,000 acquisitions during 1980-2001. Our 
data also reveal a wide distribution of good and bad acquisitions. For the +/- six-month window, of 
149 acquisitions, 46 had returns lower than -1% and 35 lower than -2%.  
 We create a dummy variable called ‘M&A’ that takes a value of one if an SEO firm 
engages in acquisitions, and zero otherwise. We re-estimate our regression model with this dummy 
variable and present result in Model 1 of Table V, Panels B, C, and D. The coefficient of the M&A 
dummy is insignificant in both Panels B and C and marginally significant in Panel D. However, 
these results hide important cross-sectional variations within the sample of acquirers. 
We divide the acquirers into three groups based on the market’s reaction to the 
announcement of acquisitions. We define three M&A dummy variables – good, neutral, and bad -  
that are equal to one (and zero otherwise) if an acquisition announcement return falls in top third, 
middle third, or bottom third of the sample distribution. Model 2 of Panel B shows that firms 
engaging in bad acquisitions experience an average market reaction of -3.17% to SEO 
announcements relative to firms with no acquisitions. In contrast, market reactions to firms with 
good and neutral acquisitions are insignificantly different from non-acquiring firms. Similar results 
hold for other panels as well. 
As a robustness check, we use alternative definitions of good, neutral, and bad acquisitions. 
In Model 3, we use an absolute cut-off of +/-1% and classify an acquisition as good, neutral, and 
                                                 
17 When there is more than one M&A deal in a given window, we take their average announcement day returns. 
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bad if the market reaction to acquisition announcement is above +1%, between -1% to +1% and 
below -1%, respectively. In Model 4, we use a cut-off of +/-2%. Irrespective of the cut-off and the 
window for the acquisition period, we find that SEO announcement day returns are negative and 
significant for firms with bad acquisitions. Investors seem to be concerned with potential misuse of 
funds and punish firms that engage in value destroying acquisitions around the time of SEO 
announcements.  
4. Interaction between external monitoring and equity incentives 
Managerial equity incentives are internal means to control agency problems. There is also 
external pressure to reduce agency costs stemming from monitoring the agent’s actions by 
institutional investors and from the market for corporate control. We hypothesize that the effect of 
equity incentives is greater when managers are subject to less external monitoring.  
To test this hypothesis, we use three distinct proxies for external monitoring and analyze 
how they interact with equity incentives. The first proxy is the shareholdings by public pension 
funds. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and Gillan and Starks (2000) find that large pension funds 
stand out among institutional investors in successfully monitoring firms. Cremers and Nair (2005) 
find that public pension fund (PPF) ownership and takeover vulnerability interact in long-term 
abnormal returns. Davis and Kim (2006) show that among institutional investors, PPFs most 
proactively seek shareholder interests in proxy voting. We obtain the PPF holdings from the 13-F 
filings of institutional investors for the quarter ended just before and after the SEO announcement 
and take its average as a proxy for the PPF’s shareholding at the time of SEO announcements. We 
define a dummy variable ‘High Monitoring’ equal to one for firms that fall in the top quartile in 
terms of the PPF’s shareholding, and zero otherwise. A second dummy variable ‘Low Monitoring’ 
equals one minus ‘High Monitoring’. These dummy variables are interacted with equity incentive.  
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We use the shareholdings of institutional block-holders as our second measure of external 
monitoring. Large concentrated shareholdings by institutional shareholders may limit the agency 
problems emanating from dispersed shareholding of public corporations (see Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)). Like PPF holdings, we obtain data on institutional block-holders (defined as institutional 
shareholders with more than 5% holdings) from the 13-F filing a quarter before and after the SEO 
announcement and take the average. We also define two dummy variables, ‘High’ and ‘Low’ 
monitoring, taking a value of one (and zero otherwise) for firms in the top quartile and for the rest 
in terms of block-holder shareholdings, respectively. 
Our third measure of external pressure is the anti-takeover index of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). They construct the governance index from Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) publications, which includes inputs from both firm-specific charter provisions as 
well as state corporate laws. A higher GIM-index corresponds to more anti-takeover provisions, 
insulating managers from the market for corporate control. We obtain the GIM index for the latest 
year before the SEO issuance and classify firms into high vs. low pressure depending on whether 
they fall into the bottom quartile (GIM index < 8) or not. Unlike other measures, GIM-index data 
is available for only 255 out of 457 sample firms.18   
Results are provided in Table VI. Models 1 and 2 provide similar results. Whether the 
monitoring is done by public pension funds or block holders, the equity incentive does not have 
explanatory power for firms that are subject to a very high degree of outside monitoring. Only 
when firms are subject to less external monitoring do we find a positive and significant relation 
between equity incentive and investor reaction. Apparently, investors are less worried about 
agency problems when a firm is subject to a high degree of external monitoring. But when such 
                                                 
18 For this estimation we drop industry fixed-effects because of the small sample size. 
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external force is not very strong, investors pay close attention to equity incentive as a controlling 
device against misuse of corporate funds.  
Model 3 with the GIM index show results that point to the same direction as those with 
institutional investors; namely, equity incentives have explanatory power only when managements 
are somewhat protected against the threat from the market for corporate control. However, the 
model has a very poor fit even by the standard of cross-sectional studies that typically show quite 
low R squares. In an unreported regression, we also use the interaction of GIM index and the 
presence of block-holders as a proxy for high monitoring because Cremers and Nair (2005) find 
that they complement each other. The results are very similar to those reported in Table VI. 
5. What type of incentives affects the market’s response? 
 Our measure of equity incentives includes managers’ holdings of restricted and unrestricted 
stocks and vested and unvested options. Does the market pay equal attention to all types of 
incentives or are there systematic differences across various components? To answer this question, 
we decompose Delta and announcement returns are regressed on separate components of equity 
incentives. The results are reported in Table VII. In Model 1, returns are regressed on stock Delta 
only, excluding the Delta of option holdings. In Model 2, we break stock Delta into Delta of 
restricted stocks and unrestricted stocks. Model 3 uses Delta of option holdings only. Model 4 
includes all; restricted stock Delta, non-restricted stock Delta, and option Delta. Because a specific 
component of incentives may have zero value for some firms, in Models 2, 3, and 4 we construct 
our incentive measure as log ((1 + delta of the respective component)/total compensation)) in order 
to include observations with zero incentive in any given category.  
A consistent pattern emerges from the results in Table VII. Stock based incentives, and not 
option based incentives, have significant positive impacts on announcement day returns. And 
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within stock-based incentives, it is the non-restricted part that provides the impact. Although these 
results warrant further theoretical investigation, we notice that investors seem to put more weight 
on those components of incentives that are closer to managers’ direct equity ownership and easier 
to value. 
 Restricted stocks are often contingent upon achieving a predetermined goal, and may not 
be granted if managers fail to achieve the goal or leave the company before expiration of the 
vesting period. Because of this uncertainty, the market may consider vested stocks more effective 
in aligning manager-shareholder interests. In addition, stock prices also are readily observable 
from the stock market, whereas valuation of executive stock options requires a number of 
assumptions and investors may have difficulty understanding their ramifications.19  Furthermore, 
when stock options fall underwater they are relatively ineffective in creating ownership incentive 
and raise the expectation of re-pricing, which further undermines incentives ex-ante (Hall and 
Knox (2004)). 
6. Long-term effects 
Are there any long-term implications of the equity incentive on the stock returns of issuing firms? 
Studies involving long-term returns are treacherous tasks due to various statistical biases and 
benchmarking issues surrounding them (see Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner 
(1997)). There is ongoing debate whether or not controlling for risks SEOs underperform in the 
long run.20 We do not attempt to address that issue. Smaller sample sizes make the task of 
                                                 
19 The valuation of executive options may differ from the value implied by the modified Black-Scholes formula for 
several reasons.  Most executives are not able to trade their options or short-sell their company’s stock to hedge the 
option risks. Further, the risk-neutral valuation formula may not be appropriate to executives because they hold 
undiversified portfolios with disproportionately high investment in their own company (see Murphy (1999)). For these 
reasons, executives may value their options lower than the value placed by an outside investor, although it also is 
possible for them to value options higher if they possess highly optimistic information unavailable to other market 
participants (see Yermack (1997)).  
20 See, for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) for evidence in support of underperformance and Eckbo, Masulis, and 
Norli (2000) for flaws in the long-term performance measure. 
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detecting long term performance even harder. Our only goal is to understand whether cross-
sectionally, high incentive SEO firms exhibit different long run performance from low incentive 
SEO firms on a risk-adjusted basis.  
To conduct this test, we follow the method used in Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) which is similar in spirit to the Fama-McBeth approach. For each SEO, we obtain 60 
monthly returns (or returns until delisting date, whichever is earlier) starting from the month after 
the announcement. We consider four factors; market, size, book-to-market, and momentum in 
Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997). We regress monthly returns of the SEO firms on one 
(market only), two (market and size), three (market, size, and B/M), and all four factors. The 
intercepts from these regressions are defined as risk-adjusted returns with respect to the given 
factors.  We use these intercepts as the dependent variable for regressions on various firm and 
issue characteristics at the time of SEO. We consider five year returns. If a firm offers multiple 
issues in five years, we will obtain overlapping returns from the same firm making our statistical 
inferences biased. We repeat our analysis by considering only the first SEO by a firm in any 
overlapping five-year period and obtain similar (unreported) results.  
In the cross-sectional regression, we control for firm size (log sales), market-to-book ratio, 
and secondary offering dummy. We also control for change in leverage after the equity issuance 
because Eckbo et al. (2000) illustrate the importance of adjusting for reductions in leverage in 
studying the SEO long run performance. To construct the leverage change, we start with the 
leverage (long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets) from the prior fiscal year. 
Then we compute the ‘new leverage’ by adding SEO proceeds to the total assets of the firm and 
assuming no debt has been issued concurrently. The difference between old and new leverage is 
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taken as a measure of decrease in leverage subsequent to equity issuance. Finally, Teoh et al. 
(1998) document that high accrual SEOs underperform in the long run, so we control for accruals. 
Long-term return results are provided in Table VIII. The coefficient on the incentive 
variable is not significant regardless of the number of factors used in estimating risk-adjusted 
returns. Although the market discriminates SEOs based on the issuing firm’s managerial equity 
incentives, its discriminatory response appears timely without any lingering effect. 
Our long run results are also consistent with previous literature on leverage and accruals. 
The leverage change subsequent to the SEO issuance is negative and significant for all model 
specifications. The lower returns associated with a decrease in leverage are consistent with Eckbo 
et al.’s finding that much of the long run underperformance can be explained by lower expected 
returns associated with the lower leverage following SEOs. Accruals are also significantly negative 
for three and four factor models, consistent with Teoh et al.’s finding that high-accrual firms 
underperform in the long run. 
7. Robustness checks 
 In this section we present a battery of checks on sample selection, endogeneity, alternative 
specifications, the relation between operating performance and equity incentives, alternative 
measures of equity incentives, and confounding events due to earnings releases around SEO 
announcements.  
 As stated earlier, our sample may contain large-firm bias because the compensation 
database covers only S&P 1500 firms. Because S&P 1500 also covers firms from mid-cap and 
small-cap indices, we do not expect severe bias. Nevertheless, we repeat our base regressions 
(corresponding to Model 1 of Table IV) using the Heckman (1979) two-step selection model. We 
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find virtually no change in the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients and therefore 
conclude that our main results are robust to the sample selection problem.21 
In our estimation procedure, firm specific variables are regressed on the stock market 
response; hence, any reverse causality problem is unlikely. In addition, the market’s response to 
SEOs is regressed on equity incentives measured from the end of the prior fiscal year, making the 
key independent variable known ahead of the dependent variable. This lag reduces the potential 
simultaneity bias.  
The regression models may suffer, however, from an omitted variable that may lead to an 
endogeneity problem. For example, the decision to issue equity as well as its timing and the level 
of managerial incentives may be driven by some firm specific factors that are not controlled for in 
the regressions. In such a case, the OLS estimates will be inconsistent due to the well known 
omitted variable bias. We address this bias by using an instrumental variable regression following 
Coles et al. (2006). We model the market’s reaction to SEO announcements and incentives as 
endogenous variables and estimate a two-stage regression model. In the first stage we regress 
equity incentive on its known determinants and all exogenous variables of the model. In the second 
stage, the predicted values of incentives are used as the key explanatory variable.  
Another source of endogeneity is that our measure of equity incentives reflects the 
accumulation of past equity-based compensations designed to mitigate agency problems. As such, 
one may argue that firms with higher equity incentives may have more, not less, agency problems. 
                                                 
21 In the selection-bias model, we first estimate a probit model for the likelihood of a firm’s inclusion into the S&P 
1500 index. To do this, we collect data on all SEOs by non-S&P 1500 firms during the sample period (1994-2003) and 
add them to the sample. We use firm size (log (sales)) and the number of analysts following the stock as explanatory 
variables in the probit model. We choose these variables for the selection model because larger firms and firms with 
more analyst coverage are more likely to be included in the S&P 1500 index. We obtain the inverse mill’s ratio from 
this model and use it in the second stage OLS model (with market return as the dependent variable) to correct for the 
sample selection bias as suggested by Heckman (1979). We find a positive and significant coefficient (at 1%) on the 
equity incentive variable in the OLS model. All other results are qualitatively similar to the results for Model 1 in 
Table IV. 
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To address this issue, we estimate a target level of equity incentive for each firm and then take the 
deviation from the target level as the explanatory variable. Following Core and Guay (1999) and 
Coles et al., we model the target incentive level as a function of firm size (log sales); market-to-
book ratio; a measure of dividend constraint that equals one if the firm’s dividend payout is more 
than twice its retained earnings, and zero otherwise; cash flow normalized by total assets; the 
firm’s stock return volatility (measured as the log of the standard deviation of daily stock return in 
the prior fiscal year); R&D to total asset ratio; leverage; and net operating loss carry-forwards 
scaled by total assets. We control for industry- and year fixed effects as well as the other control 
variables used in the earlier regressions.  
In the instrumental variable regression, we use all the above variables. In addition, we use 
the lag incentive as of two fiscal years prior to the equity issuance date as the key instrument as 
advocated by Coles et al. (2006).22 The two-stage instrumental variable regression results are 
reported in Table IX, Panel A. We provide results for both first stage and second stage regressions 
for two different model specifications – our base model in Model 1 and an all-inclusive one in 
Model 2. In the first stage we find that high market-to-book ratio firms provide higher equity 
incentives to their managers, consistent with our earlier assertion that high-growth firms could be 
more vulnerable to governance problems due to the pursuit of the quiet life. Firms more 
susceptible to damages from the quiet life problem may grant more equity incentives as antidotes 
to managerial shirking. The second stage results show that the predicted values of equity incentives 
are positive and significant for both specifications.  
Panel B presents results for the deviation model. The key independent variable is the 
difference between actual equity incentives at the end of prior fiscal year and the predicted equity 
                                                 
22 The instrument in IV regression is the equity incentives two fiscal years prior because we use equity incentive from 
the most recent fiscal year prior to the SEO announcement. 
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incentives based on the target model. Again the results are robust, suggesting more favorable 
market reaction when managerial self-interests are more closely aligned with shareholders’ than 
customary given a firm’s characteristics. 
As a further robustness check on equity incentives, we examine whether firms with higher 
equity incentives indeed utilize financial resources more productively. If they do, rational investors 
will be less concerned with misuse of funds when the issuing firm has higher equity incentives. 
Three accounting measures are used as proxies for operating performance; return on assets (ROA), 
EBITDA/Sales margin, and asset turnover ratio (Sales/Assets). These measures are industry 
adjusted by subtracting industry median numbers for the same calendar year based on two-digit 
SIC codes.  
Table X reports the median firm’s industry-adjusted ROA, EBITDA/Sales, and 
Sales/Assets across four incentive groups from low to high. Panels A, B, and C contain the results 
for years -1, 0, and +1, respectively, relative to year for which equity incentive is measured. High 
incentive firms have higher profitability ratios in both ROA and EBITDA margin, for all three 
years compared to the low incentive firms. The differences are statistically significant at 1%.23 
Similarly, high incentive firms utilize their assets more, as shown by higher asset turnover ratios, 
compared to low incentive firms. One cannot infer any causation between incentives and operating 
performance based on these results. However, a positive correlation between the two measures is 
sufficient for our purpose. As long as investors believe that high incentive firms deploy their funds 
more profitably, they will be less worried about potential misuse of proceeds when top 
management has more equity incentives.  
                                                 
23 This finding is consistent with those of Morck, Sheifer, and Vishny (1988) who find a positive relation between 
firm performance and stock ownership for firms where managers hold 0% to 5% of the outstanding stocks. The stock 
ownership for the top five managers of our median sample firm is 1.8%. See also McConnell and Servaes (1990) and 
Mehran (1995) for further evidence on effects of stock ownership and stock-based compensation on firm performance. 
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We also check robustness of our equity incentive measure to different estimation 
procedures. The results are reported in Table XI. In Model 1, we take the (log) average of 
Delta/Total Compensation of the top five managers, instead of their summed measures as in the 
base case. Intuitively, this measure assumes that each top executive has equal weight in the 
decision making process. In Model 2, we simply take the (log) of percentage shares held by the top 
five managers. This measure ignores the effect of option holdings.24 Finally, in Model 3, we use a 
measure similar to our base case except for the sum of salary and bonus as the deflator (as opposed 
to the total compensation in the base case). Table XI shows that no matter which measure is used, 
investor reactions are more positive when equity incentives are higher returns and are strongly 
negative when secondary offerings are included.  
Finally, we check for possible confounding effects caused by earnings announcements 
around SEOs. In our sample, 48 firms released earnings in the (-2, +2) window of SEO 
announcements. Our results do not change if these firms are excluded from the sample.  
III. Conclusions 
 This paper attempts to assess the relevance of pure signaling effects, adverse selection 
problems, and agency problems in explaining investor reaction to SEOs and to disentangle their 
joint effects. Of the three possible explanations, pure signaling effects and agency problems 
exhibit significant explanatory power. Investors react to the negative signal conveyed when 
insiders and block-holders sell their shareholdings through secondary offerings. Investor reaction 
is positively related to managerial equity stakes, apparently because they help reduce agency 
problems. However, the mere act of issuing equity, such as primary offerings by high equity 
incentive firms, does not convey a negative signal, thereby casting doubt on the Myers and 
                                                 
24Jung et al. (1996) also document that firms with low managerial ownership experience the most negative stock price 
reaction with a smaller subsample; however, their high-ownership firms still show a mean abnormal return of -2.56% 
during SEO announcement periods. 
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Majluf’s adverse selection problem as a primary explanation for the negative investor reaction to 
SEOs. The results are robust to various model specifications and control variables. 
The lack of empirical support for the adverse selection problem in our study is subject to 
caveats, however. Because our sample is based on relatively large firms, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that one may find more supportive evidence with a sample of small firms. It is also 
possible better empirical proxies for adverse selection may alter the results. Therefore, all we can 
safely conclude is that adverse selection problems seem to be a second order of importance for 
relatively large firms.  
Our results concerning equity incentives and secondary offerings have important 
implications for how frictions and their remedies affect firm valuation and the cost of capital. 
Because of agency problems, implementation of a sound managerial incentive system, an 
important facet of good corporate governance, enhances firm valuation and lowers the cost of 
newly issued equity. When insiders sell their personal shareholdings through secondary offerings, 
informational asymmetry seems to impose a substantial cost on the firm by lowering the firm 
value and raising the cost of external equity capital.  
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Appendix: Construction of Delta 
We follow the methodology used in Core and Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) 
to construct the Delta of managerial compensation. For the sake of completeness, we reproduce the 
methodology in this appendix. The Delta of a manager is the sum of the Deltas for the exercisable 
and unexercisable options plus the Delta of her shareholdings. Delta of shareholding is defined as 
shares owned (Execucomp variable SHROWN) * 0.01 * end of fiscal year price (Execucomp 
variable PRCCF). Thus, 
Stock Delta = SHROWN*PRCCF*0.01. 
We compute the Delta of the exercisable and unexercisable options separately. These estimates are 
based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for valuing European call options following the Core 
and Guay (1999) methodology. The option value of a call option is: 
Option value = [S*exp(-d*T) *N(Z)-X*exp(-r*T)*N(Z-σ*sqrt(T))], 
Where  
Z = [ln(S/X)+T(r-d+σ2/2)]/(σ*sqrt(T)) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = the closing price of the company's stock at most recent fiscal year end  
       (Execucomp variable PRCCF) 
X = exercise price of the option.  
Following the papers cited above, we compute the average exercise price (X) in two steps. First, 
we divide the value the manager would have realized at year end if she had exercised all of her 
vested and unvested (exercisable and unexercisable) options that had an exercise price below the 
market price (Execucomp variables INMONEX and INMONUN, respectively) by the number of 
vested and unvested options the manager held at year end (Execucomp variables UEXNUMEX 
and UEXNUMUN, respectively). Second, we subtract the quotients from the end of fiscal year 
price (PRCCF) to get the average exercise price. 
 σ is the standard deviation stock return volatility calculated over 60 months as used in 
Execucomp's Black-Scholes valuation of options (Execucomp variable BS_VOLAT). r stands for 
the risk-free interest rate. Interest rate yields are the natural log of Treasury bond yields from 
CRSP as quoted at the firm's fiscal year end. If T = 1, r is the one-year bond yield; if T = 2 or 3, r 
is the two-year bond yield; if T = 4 or T = 5, r is the five-year bond yield; if 6 <= T <= 8, r is the 
seven-year bond yield; and if T = 9 or T = 10, r is the ten-year bond yield. 
 T stands for the time to maturity of the option in years. We compute time to maturity in 
years from Execucomp data for each grant during the year assuming that the grant was made at the 
end of the firm's fiscal year. First, we compute the average time to maturity of all grants during the 
year and round it to the nearest whole year. Then for exercisable options, we take T as (0.7 * 
average time to maturity)– 3. It is set to 1, if (0.7 * average time to maturity)– 3 <0. It is set to 6 if 
the data are missing. For unexercisable options, we take T as (0.7 * average time to maturity)– 1. It 
is set to 9 if the data are missing. It is set to 1 if this number is negative. The maximum value of T 
is set at 10. 
 d stands for the natural logarithm of expected dividend yield for fiscal year (Execucomp 
variable BS_YIELD), which is taken as the company's average dividend yield over the past three 
years. 
 The option Delta, which is the sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price, is 
defined as: 
Option Delta=[δ(option value)/ δ(price)]*(price/100) = exp(-d*T)*N(Z)*(price/100) 
The total Delta of manager is given by the sum of stock Delta and option Delta. 
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Table IA: Descriptive Statistics of SEOs and Announcement Returns 
 
This table provides yearly distribution of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in our sample. Panel A provides mean and 
median statistics for all SEOs (pure primary, pure secondary, and mixed offerings); Panel B provides the statistics for 
the sample of pure primary and mixed offerings only; Panel C reproduces these statistics for pure primary offerings; 
Panel D has only pure secondary offerings. ‘Nobs’ represents the number of SEOs in the sample period. ‘OP’ is the 
offer price of SEO in $. ‘Proceeds’ denotes the amount of money raised in the SEOs, in millions of dollars. ‘Sale’ 
represents the prior fiscal year sales of the issuing firm measured in millions of dollars. ‘PR/MV’ represents the 
proceeds raised in the SEO as a percentage of its pre-issue market capitalization. The market capitalization is 
measured as of the end of last fiscal year before the security issuance. CAR21 (CAR22) measures cumulative 
abnormal return (relative to value-weighted market index) over (-2, +1) ((-2, +2)) day window around the 
announcement date. The last row represents the pooled observation across the entire sample period.  
 
 
Panel A: All  SEOs (Pure Primary, Mixed, and Pure Secondary Issues)      
  Mean   Median 
Year Nobs OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22   OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22 
1994 39 30.87 186.87 4036.00 13.79 -2.25 -2.40  28.50 105.10 897.10 10.78 -1.02 -1.23 
1995 69 33.26 149.20 3471.61 18.05 -0.85 -0.53  30.00 108.40 392.39 15.08 -0.63 -0.94 
1996 75 29.96 160.97 1294.48 20.12 -1.56 -1.12  28.75 101.30 496.01 15.93 -1.49 -1.63 
1997 65 33.48 167.87 1844.09 22.58 -3.40 -3.63  30.00 107.20 595.36 12.34 -2.82 -2.78 
1998 58 40.05 247.74 2445.21 14.04 -0.59 -0.33  40.63 146.10 771.57 9.98 -1.73 -0.67 
1999 71 49.93 418.34 3120.96 17.13 -0.12 -0.81  41.00 205.90 968.16 13.90 -0.82 -1.34 
2000 66 56.29 384.22 1652.31 18.61 -2.36 -2.08  44.00 192.95 408.57 12.98 -1.39 -0.98 
2001 56 32.84 255.47 3146.99 11.95 -1.11 0.19  25.25 136.15 817.38 11.12 -1.61 0.39 
2002 54 28.96 283.31 4560.51 14.54 -1.64 -1.85  25.88 152.85 1915.78 10.16 -1.72 -2.11 
2003 44 23.63 221.79 1939.38 22.91 -1.09 -0.86  19.38 110.45 645.82 16.16 -0.87 -0.33 
Pool 597 36.76 250.19 2670.34 17.56 -1.48 -1.33   30.50 130.10 634.29 13.27 -1.50 -1.12 
               
Panel B: Pure Primary and Mixed Issues Only          
  Mean   Median 
Year Nobs OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22   OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22 
1994 27 28.59 147.73 1736.51 15.03 -2.83 -2.95  26.88 97.50 595.74 13.33 -0.77 -1.23 
1995 53 33.39 120.10 3434.63 21.07 -1.02 -0.58  30.00 95.80 284.65 18.16 -1.30 -0.94 
1996 53 28.54 116.15 712.38 22.94 -1.53 -1.00  28.00 92.40 340.86 19.27 -0.81 -1.61 
1997 44 33.50 145.55 1153.44 27.36 -3.75 -4.07  30.75 96.90 470.01 14.50 -2.84 -1.65 
1998 45 37.84 226.84 2058.27 15.07 -0.19 0.05  39.88 130.10 546.01 11.83 -1.58 -0.50 
1999 55 48.15 364.88 2152.90 19.50 -0.57 -0.98  40.50 166.10 604.58 15.04 -0.87 -1.34 
2000 58 55.56 358.04 1598.46 19.41 -2.08 -1.72  46.50 187.60 337.38 13.22 -1.06 -0.42 
2001 46 28.23 209.93 3022.27 12.25 -1.00 0.65  24.25 117.95 620.21 11.15 -1.61 0.16 
2002 43 24.94 251.37 4465.20 15.34 -1.11 -1.23  23.16 142.50 1501.06 10.02 -1.47 -2.04 
2003 33 24.36 187.58 1863.15 25.40 -0.78 -0.46  22.00 105.20 615.53 16.88 -0.72 0.39 
Pool 457 35.62 220.16 2218.12 19.43 -1.44 -1.16   30.00 116.70 513.15 14.66 -1.34 -0.86 
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Table IA continued……. 
Panel C: Pure Primary Issues Only           
  Mean   Median 
Year Nobs OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22   OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22 
1994 22 29.85 164.63 2048.70 15.16 -2.07 -1.98   27.25 99.00 626.99 13.98 -0.62 -0.59 
1995 39 34.45 128.39 4580.80 19.35 -0.57 -0.02  34.25 95.80 394.29 15.66 -0.63 -0.53 
1996 44 27.26 120.69 785.61 22.00 -1.58 -0.71  24.75 94.00 453.53 19.09 -0.54 -0.96 
1997 31 34.17 150.96 1355.90 14.24 -3.15 -3.64  28.50 82.50 511.44 12.30 -2.69 -1.65 
1998 35 39.18 240.91 2412.46 14.76 0.04 0.65  40.00 123.80 673.20 10.69 -1.04 -0.19 
1999 42 44.78 357.57 2612.00 17.16 -0.66 -1.04  39.19 171.25 922.29 14.83 -0.84 -0.49 
2000 43 56.46 325.83 1996.62 17.15 -0.89 -0.96  50.00 199.90 348.27 11.71 0.24 0.65 
2001 36 27.77 216.69 3730.33 11.12 -0.82 0.72  21.50 116.35 721.22 10.32 -1.48 0.68 
2002 40 24.88 262.91 4764.16 15.21 -0.78 -0.78  22.33 145.65 1744.96 9.90 -0.98 -1.21 
2003 29 25.49 193.11 1993.54 26.29 -0.55 -0.16   23.08 105.20 615.53 16.65 -0.52 1.37 
Pool 361 35.11 221.60 2667.56 17.29 -1.04 -0.72   30.00 117.30 595.36 13.74 -0.81 -0.50 
 
 
Panel D: Pure Secondary Issues Only           
  Mean   Median 
Year Nobs OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22   OP Proceeds Sale PR/MV CAR21 CAR22 
1994 12 35.99 274.94 9209.85 10.98 -0.94 -1.15  30.56 179.60 3407.56 7.80 -1.28 -1.02 
1995 16 33.37 283.26 12334.00 7.73 -0.36 -0.18  32.05 258.10 1871.30 5.32 0.16 -0.64 
1996 22 33.91 259.58 2587.77 14.05 -1.35 -1.03  33.13 116.30 1336.10 11.83 -2.59 -1.63 
1997 21 35.64 225.18 3372.92 12.31 -2.67 -2.67  31.06 154.30 1958.85 10.33 -2.75 -2.82 
1998 13 47.69 320.08 3784.60 10.47 -1.99 -1.64  43.19 277.40 3124.81 7.81 -2.12 -1.77 
1999 16 55.64 562.62 6707.22 8.06 1.33 -0.15  55.00 268.60 3618.00 4.53 0.00 -2.04 
2000 8 56.79 510.42 1963.54 11.40 -4.74 -5.56  40.00 186.00 1197.96 11.50 -5.79 -5.61 
2001 10 54.06 464.97 3720.68 10.58 -1.64 -1.93  35.08 184.35 2157.99 11.12 -2.05 0.58 
2002 11 43.53 377.68 4582.60 10.76 -3.42 -3.74  35.75 162.85 2346.99 10.60 -3.91 -3.88 
2003 11 21.44 324.40 2168.08 15.43 -1.99 -2.03  18.75 142.00 1535.66 10.73 -3.42 -2.94 
Pool 140 40.88 346.18 5164.02 11.17 -1.55 -1.76   34.31 192.05 1950.26 9.40 -1.99 -2.03 
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Table IB: Mean and Median Statistics of Executive Compensation 
Panel A provides mean and median statistics for all SEOs, Panel B provides the statistics for the sample of pure 
primary and mixed offerings only, Panel C and D reproduce these statistics for pure primary and pure secondary 
offerings, respectively. We provide the compensation for CEO and the sum of top five executives of the firm 
(represented under the heading ‘Top 5 Sum’) for fiscal year prior to the equity issuance. All data come from the 
COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation Database. All compensation numbers are in thousands of dollars. ‘Option-
Grant’ measures the Black-Scholes value of option grants during the last fiscal year. ‘Stock Grant’ measures the value 
of restricted stocks granted to the executives in the last fiscal year. ‘Total’ denotes the total compensation of 
executives and includes salary, bonus, value of restricted stock grant during the year, the Black-Scholes value of total 
options granted during the year, long-term incentive payments, and other miscellaneous items. ‘Delta’ represents the 
equity-based incentive of the manager. It represents the dollar (in ‘000) gain (loss) in manager’s stock and stock option 
holdings for a one percent increase (decrease) in the stock price of the firm. To compute delta we take all stocks, 
including restricted stocks, held by the manager as of the end of prior fiscal year. Similarly, for this computation we 
consider all options held by the manager as of the end of the prior fiscal year. While stock’s delta is simply given by 
0.01*Stock Value, the option’s delta is computed using the modified Black-Scholes formula for a dividend paying 
stock. Delta represents the sum of stock delta and option delta. ‘Delta/Total’ measures the ratio of Delta to the total 
compensation of the manager. For CEO, we first compute the ratio for each firm and then report the mean across all 
firms. To compute the ‘Top 5’ manager’s incentive, we add the compensation of all five managers and then divide the 
summed delta of top five managers with the summed total compensation of top five managers for each firm. We report 
the mean and median across all firms in the table below. ‘% Ownership’ measures the percentage of firm’s common 
stock held by the executives as of the last fiscal year end. Panel A is based on 597 observations, Panel B on 457, Panel 
C on 361 and Panel D on 140 observations. 
 Salary Bonus Option-Gr Stock-Gr Total Delta Delta/Total % Ownership 
Panel A: ALL SEOs (Pure Primary, Mixed and Pure Secondary Issues) 
Mean Statistics               
CEO 545.61 582.88 2730.57 348.92 4447.88 987.69 0.54 3.62 
Top 5 Sum 1671.62 1446.20 6641.07 876.51 11259.80 1762.33 0.23 5.88 
Median Statistics               
CEO 475.00 300.00 687.23 0.00 1813.40 250.50 0.10 0.64 
Top 5 Sum 1467.09 823.27 544.09 0.00 5297.94 544.09 0.08 1.59 
Panel B: Pure Primary and Mixed Issues Only 
Mean Statistics               
CEO 496.70 516.76 2576.60 330.37 4148.66 893.43 0.54 3.53 
Top 5 Sum 1515.68 1251.13 6031.56 828.99 10206.48 1636.33 0.21 5.96 
Median Statistics               
CEO 420.00 256.96 672.31 0.00 1699.31 215.56 0.10 0.77 
Top 5 Sum 1352.10 715.00 465.23 0.00 4906.99 465.23 0.08 1.80 
Panel C: Pure Primary Issues Only 
Mean Statistics               
CEO 528.18 528.41 2271.25 381.41 3976.35 771.54 0.46 2.60 
Top 5 Sum 1580.34 1286.31 5741.98 971.62 10253.59 1400.08 0.18 4.35 
Median Statistics               
CEO 450.00 261.53 649.67 0.00 1704.45 201.71 0.09 0.59 
Top 5 Sum 1410.00 775.00 421.47 0.00 4938.20 421.47 0.07 1.39 
Panel D: Pure Secondary Issues Only 
Mean Statistics               
CEO 706.90 789.06 3105.01 407.82 5343.72 1271.75 0.61 3.85 
Top 5 Sum 2168.19 2071.52 8310.69 1033.51 14429.58 2139.25 0.29 5.51 
Median Statistics               
CEO 636.40 456.92 728.59 0.00 2396.12 375.80 0.09 0.47 
Top 5 Sum 1923.42 1307.35 749.78 0.00 7246.83 749.78 0.08 1.02 
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Table II: Mean SEO Announcement Day Return by Equity Incentive Groups 
This table provides the announcement day return across various equity incentive groups. Every year, we break all 
SEOs into four groups based on the equity incentive (i.e., delta/total compensation ratio) of the top five managers of 
the firm. Q1 represents the lowest quartile of equity-incentive, Q4 the highest. For each of these groups, we compute 
the return around (-2, +1) and (-2, +2) days of the announcement date. All returns are adjusted for the value-weighted 
return on CRSP index for the same days. We report mean return of all four quartiles and the difference between High 
(Q4) and Low (Q1) incentive groups. The ‘p-value’ test is for the null hypothesis that the return difference between 
high and low incentive firms is zero. Panel A is based on the aggregate sample of 597 SEOs including pure primary, 
pure secondary, and mixed offerings; Panel B is based on 457 SEOs that do not include pure secondary offerings (i.e, 
pure primary and mixed offerings); Panel C is based on 361 pure primary SEOs; Panel D is based on 140 pure 
secondary SEOs.  
 
 
  Event Window   Event Window   Event Window   Event Window 
Group (-2,+1) (-2,+2)   (-2,+1) (-2,+2)   (-2,+1) (-2,+2)   (-2,+1) (-2,+2) 
  Panel A   Panel B   Panel C  Panel D 
  All SEOs   
Pure Primary & 





Q1 (Lowest) -2.37 -1.95  -2.67 -2.02  -2.32 -1.68   -1.65 -1.71 
Q2 -1.43 -1.34  -1.14 -1.09  -1.53 -1.21  -1.47 -1.18 
Q3 -1.28 -1.52  -1.29 -1.54  -0.28 -0.28  -1.81 -2.03 
Q4 (Highest) -0.85 -0.5  -0.69 -0.01  -0.11 0.23  -1.26 -2.09 
High-Low 1.52 1.44   1.98 2.02   2.21 1.91   0.39 -0.38 
p-Value 0.04 0.05   0.02 0.03   0.03 0.08   0.77 0.76 
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Table III: Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the regression analyses. All accounting numbers 
are measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the security issuance. MCAP represents the market capitalization, in 
millions of dollars, and is computed by multiplying COMPUSTAT item 25 (common shares outstanding) with 199 (fiscal 
year closing price). Sales (COMPUSTAT item number 12) represents the annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB 
is the market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book 
value of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60 respectively. 
Cash measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the book value of assets. Leverage is computed 
by taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets. Past-Ret is the return of issuing 
firm over the past one year, measured until the beginning of the issuing month. Return data is obtained from CRSP. Accrual 
is constructed by subtracting COMPUSTAT item 308 (net cash flow from operating activities) from 172 (net income) and 
dividing the difference with the total assets. Growth measures the percentage long term consensus growth forecast in the 
earnings of the firm by analysts. Analyst measures the number of analysts following a stock.  Growth and Analyst data are 
measured a month before the SEO filing and both are obtained from the I\B\E\S.  This table is based on 457 observations of 
pure primary and mixed offerings. 
 
 
Variable NOBS Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
MCAP 457 3310.34 774.19 35.50 87255.34 8848.04 
Sales 457 2218.12 513.15 1.05 152172.00 8337.86 
MB 457 2.81 1.80 0.75 29.54 2.82 
Cash 457 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.91 0.20 
Leverage 457 0.27 0.26 0.00 1.25 0.20 
Past-Ret 457 0.93 0.54 -0.98 9.72 1.30 
Accrual 457 -0.06 -0.04 -3.04 0.26 0.17 
Growth 329 22.23 20.33 3.00 75.00 10.03 
Analyst 356 10.25 9.00 1.00 37.00 6.71 
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 Table IV: Industry- and Year Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Market Reaction 
 
This table provides regression results for industry (based on two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is the market-adjusted return on SEO firms during (-2, +2) day window surrounding the announcement date. 
Incentive measures log (Delta/Total Compensation) of top five executives of the firm. Sales represents the log annual sales of 
the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s 
equity + book value of assets – book value of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from 
COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60 respectively. Cash measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the 
book value of assets. Leverage is computed by taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the 
total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero 
otherwise. Past-Ret measures log (1 + return of issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the 
issuing month. Return data is obtained from the CRSP tapes. ‘Residual Std Dev’ represents the log of standard deviation of 
residual from the market-model regression using one year’s daily return observations (ending 30 days before the SEO 
announcement date) for each SEO. Pr/MV measures proceeds raised in SEO as a fraction of pre-issue market value of the 
firm. Accrual is constructed by subtracting COMPUSTAT item 308 (net cash flow from operating activities) from 172 (net 
income) and dividing the difference with the total assets. Analyst measures the number of analysts following a stock, log (1 + 
# of analysts. The table reports the coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity-corrected p-values for four different models. 
Number of observations (NOBS) used in the estimation and the adjusted R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive 0.73 0.02   0.77 0.02 
Sales 0.40 0.19 0.41 0.18 0.47 0.15 
MB 0.03 0.84 0.11 0.44 0.06 0.70 
Cash 0.96 0.73 0.59 0.83 1.38 0.62 
Leverage 1.12 0.58 1.08 0.60 0.90 0.66 
Secondary -2.26 0.01 -1.88 0.04 -2.30 0.01 
Past-Ret 0.55 0.42 0.70 0.30 0.72 0.34 
Residual Std Dev -1.23 0.33 -1.46 0.25 -1.82 0.17 
Pr/MV     1.13 0.43 
Accrual     -2.81 0.21 
Analyst     -0.21 0.70 
NOBS 457   457   457   
AdjR2 3.57%   2.52%   3.45%   
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 Table V: Regression Results using Acquisitions by SEO Firms as a Proxy for Agency Problems 
This table provides regression results for the effect of acquisitions made by SEO firms on stock returns surrounding the SEO 
announcement date. Panel A provides summary statistics of the firms engaging in acquisitions in a +/-3, +/- 6, or +6 month 
window surrounding the SEO announcement date. CAR represents (-2,+2) event window market-adjusted returns around the 
acquisition announcement. Panels B, C, and D provide regression results. Panel B uses all M&A deals within +/- six-month 
window of SEO announcements, Panel C uses +/- three-month window, and Panel D includes only acquisitions made within 
six months after SEO announcement. All models in this table control for industry and year fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is the market-adjusted return during (-2,+2) day window surrounding the SEO announcement date. M&A Dummy 
equals one if a firm has made acquisitions in a given window surrounding the SEO announcement, zero otherwise. Incentive 
measures log (Delta/Total Compensation) of all top five executives of the firms. In Model 1, M&A Dummy takes a value of 
one if an SEO firm acquires other firms, and zero otherwise. In Model 2, Good, Neutral, and Bad M&A take values of one for 
those M&As that fall in top one-third, middle one-third, and bottom one-third of the distribution, respectively, based on 
M&A announcement day returns.  In Model 3, Good, Neutral, and Bad M&A take values of one for those M&As that have 
M&A announcement day return of above +1%, between +1% and -1%, and below -1%, respectively. In Model 4, we classify 
firms into Good, Neutral, and Bad M&As based on whether the M&A announcement day return is above +2%, between +2% 
to -2%, and below -2%, respectively. Sales represents the log annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the 
market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book value 
of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60, respectively. Cash 
measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the book value of assets. Leverage is computed by 
taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero otherwise. Past-Ret measures log (1 + return of 
issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the issuing month. ‘Residual Std Dev’ represents the log 
of standard deviation of residual from the market-model regression using one year’s daily return observations (ending 30 
days before the SEO announcement date) for each SEO. Return data is obtained from CRSP. All p-values are 
heteroscedasticity corrected. Number of observations (NOBS) and adjusted R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. 
   
Panel A: Summary statistics for M&A sample 
Window  +/- 3-months +/- 6-months + 6-months 
# of firms with acquisitions 94 149 77 
CAR (mean) 3.91% 2.99% 0.78% 
CAR (median) 2.73% 2.09% 1.40% 
# with CAR < -1% 27 46 29 
# with CAR < -2% 18 35 20 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: Within +/- six-months window 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive 0.76 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.74 0.02 0.72 0.02 
M&A Dummy -0.62 0.42       
Good M&A   -0.27 0.81 -0.12 0.90 0.11 0.91 
Neutral M&A   1.47 0.20 2.88 0.11 0.74 0.57 
Bad M&A   -3.17 0.01 -3.08 0.01 -3.79 0.00 
Sales 0.39 0.20 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.14 0.42 0.17 
MB 0.03 0.82 0.07 0.66 0.07 0.67 0.08 0.62 
Cash 0.89 0.74 1.37 0.61 1.21 0.65 0.85 0.75 
Leverage 1.05 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.81 0.69 
Secondary -2.27 0.01 -2.30 0.01 -2.26 0.01 -2.28 0.01 
Past-Ret 0.53 0.43 0.43 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.46 
Residual Std Dev -1.36 0.28 -1.45 0.25 -1.45 0.25 -1.37 0.28 
NOBS 457   457   457   457   
AdjR2 3.49%   5.34%   5.21%   5.03%   
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Panel C: Regression Results: Within +/- three-months window 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive 0.72 0.02 0.70 0.03 0.64 0.05 0.61 0.05 
M&A Dummy 0.42 0.63       
Good M&A   -0.42 0.76 1.86 0.08 1.97 0.08 
Neutral M&A   4.16 0.00 0.72 0.79 -0.52 0.74 
Bad M&A   -2.55 0.07 -2.80 0.06 -2.78 0.12 
Sales 0.40 0.19 0.43 0.16 0.41 0.17 0.39 0.20 
MB 0.03 0.87 0.04 0.79 0.07 0.64 0.07 0.65 
Cash 0.94 0.73 1.34 0.62 1.08 0.69 1.15 0.67 
Leverage 1.08 0.59 0.90 0.65 1.01 0.62 1.22 0.54 
Secondary -2.26 0.01 -2.35 0.01 -2.23 0.01 -2.19 0.02 
Past-Ret 0.55 0.42 0.65 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.49 
Residual Std Dev -1.13 0.37 -1.06 0.40 -1.17 0.36 -1.25 0.33 
NOBS 457   457   457   457   
AdjR2 3.39%   6.08%   4.64%   4.33%   
 
 
Panel D: Regression Results: Within next six-month window 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive 0.80 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.80 0.01 0.79 0.01 
M&A Dummy -1.60 0.09       
Good M&A   -0.39 0.80 -1.00 0.42 -0.85 0.53 
Neutral M&A   -1.72 0.26 -3.02 0.28 -0.28 0.86 
Bad M&A   -2.78 0.07 -2.11 0.15 -4.49 0.01 
Sales 0.39 0.20 0.38 0.21 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.18 
MB 0.04 0.80 0.04 0.81 0.04 0.79 0.05 0.76 
Cash 0.87 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.88 0.75 0.58 0.83 
Leverage 0.99 0.62 0.83 0.68 0.92 0.65 0.68 0.74 
Secondary -2.18 0.02 -2.26 0.01 -2.25 0.01 -2.18 0.02 
Past-Ret 0.53 0.43 0.55 0.42 0.52 0.44 0.58 0.39 
Residual Std Dev -1.30 0.30 -1.28 0.31 -1.29 0.30 -1.19 0.35 
NOBS 457   457   457   457   
AdjR2 4.00%   3.85%   3.69%   4.51%   
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Table VI: Interactions between Equity Incentives and External Monitoring  
 
This table provides regression results analyzing the interactions between equity incentives and external monitoring and 
pressure on the investor reaction.  The dependent variable is the market-adjusted return on SEOs during (-2, +2) day window 
surrounding the announcement date. Model 1 uses shareholdings by public pension funds, Model 2 uses block-holder’s 
shareholdings, and Model 3 uses the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) measure of anti-takeover provisions as proxies for 
external monitoring/ pressure. High Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that fall in top quartile of 
respective monitoring dimension; and Low Monitoring, in the bottom three-fourth. Incentive measures log (Delta/Total 
Compensation) of all top five executives of the firms.  Sales represents the log annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. 
MB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – 
book value of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60 
respectively. Cash measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the book value of assets. Leverage 
is computed by taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets. Secondary is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero otherwise. Past-Ret 
measures log (1 + return of issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the issuing month. Residual 
Std Dev represents the log of standard deviation of residual from the market-model regression using one year’s daily return 
observations (ending 30 days before the SEO announcement date) for each SEO. Return data is obtained from CRSP.  All p-
values are heteroscedasticity corrected. Models 1 and 2 use industry and year fixed effects. Due to smaller number of firms 
covered in GIM index, Model 3 is estimated for 255 observations only. Model 3 uses year fixed effect in the estimation. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Public Pension Funds Block Holders  GIM-Index  
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
High Monitoring 0.18 0.93 -2.98 0.18 -1.51 0.45 
Incentive x Low Monitoring 0.76 0.03 0.88 0.01 0.93 0.06 
Incentive x High Monitoring 0.54 0.43 -0.07 0.92 0.09 0.87 
Sales 0.37 0.23 0.37 0.23 0.57 0.08 
MB 0.03 0.82 0.03 0.86 0.10 0.57 
Cash 0.89 0.74 1.24 0.65 1.11 0.73 
Leverage 1.15 0.57 1.13 0.58 2.36 0.30 
Secondary -2.23 0.01 -2.35 0.01 -1.74 0.15 
Past-Ret 0.57 0.40 0.54 0.42 0.71 0.43 
Residual Std Dev -1.22 0.33 -1.36 0.28 0.28 0.84 
NOBS 457   457   255   
AdjR2 3.30%   3.35%   0.43%   
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Table VII: Regression Results using Different Components of Equity Incentives 
 
This table presents the regression results for various components of equity incentives. The dependent variable is the market-
adjusted return in (-2, +2) event window surrounding the SEO announcement day. In Model 1, Incentive-Stock measures log  
(Delta due to stockholdings/Total Compensation) of the top five managers of firms. In Model 2, Restricted and Non-
restricted measure the log ((1+ Delta due to restricted stock holdings)/Total Compensation) and log ((1 + Delta due to non-
restricted stock holdings)/Total Compensation), respectively. Incentive-Option measures log ((1 + Delta due to option 
holdings)/Total Compensation). Sales represents the log annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the market-to-
book ratio of the firm which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book value of 
equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60, respectively. Cash 
measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the book value of assets. Leverage is computed by 
taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero otherwise. Past-Ret measures log (1 + return of 
issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the issuing month. Residual Std Dev represents the log 
of standard deviation of residual from the market-model regression using one year’s daily return observations (ending 30 
days before the SEO announcement date) for each SEO. Return data is obtained from CRSP.  The table reports the coefficient 
estimates and heteroscedasticity-corrected p-values. Number of observations (NOBS) used in the estimation and the adjusted 
R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. All models use industry and year fixed effects. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive-Stock 0.53 0.01       
Restricted   0.23 0.30   0.21 0.35 
Non-restricted   0.56 0.00   0.58 0.00 
Incentive-Option     -0.13 0.70 -0.24 0.48 
Sales 0.44 0.15 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.41 0.18 
MB 0.05 0.73 0.07 0.62 0.12 0.42 0.10 0.53 
Cash 1.64 0.55 1.42 0.60 0.81 0.77 1.70 0.54 
Leverage 1.21 0.55 1.46 0.47 1.16 0.57 1.49 0.46 
Secondary -2.31 0.01 -2.19 0.01 -1.88 0.04 -2.24 0.01 
Past-Ret 0.68 0.31 0.61 0.36 0.78 0.25 0.67 0.33 
Residual Std Dev -1.20 0.34 -1.24 0.33 -1.58 0.21 -1.33 0.30 
NOBS 457   457   457   457   
AdjR2 4.17%   4.56%   2.40%   4.44%   
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Table VIII: Cross-sectional Regression Results for Long Term Returns Following SEO Announcement 
 
For each SEO, we compute the risk-adjusted return over the next five years starting from the month after the announcement 
date. We use four different benchmark models for the computation of risk-adjusted return. For Model 1, we regress the 
monthly return of each SEO firm on value weighted market return starting from the month just after the announcement date 
and continuing through the next 60 months (or delisting date, whichever is earlier). The intercept from that regression is the 
‘long term risk-adjusted return’ with respect to the one-factor model. For Model 2, we regress SEO firm’s monthly return on 
market and Fama-French Size factor. Model 3 accounts for Fama-French Market-to-Book factor as well. In Model 4, we add 
the momentum factor in the computation of risk-adjusted return. We regress these risk-adjusted returns on various 
explanatory variables representing the SEO characteristics. Incentive measures (log (Delta/Total Compensation)) of the top 5 
managers of the firm. Sales represents the log annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the market-to-book ratio 
of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book value of equity)/(book 
value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60, respectively. Leverage Change is 
computed by taking difference in the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets in the 
prior fiscal year and the same ratio computed after adding the SEO proceeds into total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero otherwise. Accrual is constructed by 
subtracting COMPUSTAT item 308 (net cash-flow from operating activities) from 172 (net income) and dividing the 
difference with the total assets.  All p-values are heteroskedasticity corrected. Number of observations (NOBS) and adjusted 
R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. 
 
Dependent Variable: Long-Term Risk Adjusted Return         
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Intercept 0.241 0.76 0.277 0.72 0.166 0.84 0.722 0.39 
Incentive -0.006 0.95 -0.032 0.76 -0.094 0.40 -0.145 0.27 
Sales -0.003 0.97 -0.005 0.96 -0.081 0.39 -0.139 0.18 
MB 0.067 0.41 0.022 0.77 0.127 0.09 0.103 0.13 
Leverage Change -5.826 0.04 -6.314 0.04 -6.005 0.06 -6.006 0.08 
Secondary 0.189 0.58 0.131 0.70 -0.033 0.93 -0.046 0.90 
Accrual -0.665 0.20 -0.464 0.50 -1.367 0.02 -1.268 0.04 
NOBS 457   457   457   457   
AdjR2 1.40%   1.10%   2.50%   2.00%   
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Table IX: Alternative Econometric Specifications 
In Panel A, we model the incentive (log (Delta/Total Compensation)) of the top five managers and the return around 
announcement date as endogenous variables in a two-stage regression framework. In the first stage regression, we regress 
Incentive on all exogenous variables and the instruments. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of incentive as the 
independent variable. The dependent variable in the second stage is the market-adjusted return around (-2, +2) event window 
surrounding the SEO announcement date. We report the results of both first and second stage estimations, with industry- and 
year-fixed effects for Model 1 and Model 2.  Sales represents the log annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the 
market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book value 
of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60, respectively. Cash 
measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage of the book value of assets. Leverage is computed by 
taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided by the total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, zero otherwise. Past-Ret measures log (1 + return of 
issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the issuing month. Return data is obtained from CRSP. 
‘Residual Std Dev’ represents the log of standard deviation of residual from the market-model regression using one year’s 
daily return observations (ending 30 days before the SEO announcement date) for each SEO. Pr/MV measures proceeds 
raised in SEO as a fraction of pre-issue market value of the firm. Accrual is constructed by subtracting COMPUSTAT item 
308 (net cash flow from operating activities) from 172 (net income) and dividing the difference with the total assets. Analyst 
measures the number of analysts (log (1 + # of analysts)) following a stock.  Div-Const measures dividend constraint of the 
issuing firm. It takes a value of one if the firm’s dividend payout (item 21) is more than twice its retained earnings for the 
year (item 36). R&D represents research and developmental expenses (item 46) as a fraction of total assets. NOL is net-
operating losses carry-forward (item 52) divided by total assets. Cash flow measures firms’ cash flow from operations (item 
308) scaled by the total assets. Volatility measures the (log of) stock return volatility of issuing firms over the past one year 
using daily return data from CRSP. Lag-Incentive is the lag of the incentive variable. All p-values have been corrected to 
account for the two-stage estimation biases. In Panel B, we estimate a deviation model. In the first stage regression, we 
regress Incentive on Sale, MB, Cash flow, Leverage, Div-Const, R&D, NOL and Volatility along with industry- and year fixed 
effects. We take the residual from this estimate and call the residual variable Incentive-Deviation. In the second stage we use 
Incentive-Deviation as our measure of managerial equity incentives. Both Models 1 and 2 use industry- and year fixed 
effects. In Panel A, regressions are estimated with fewer observations than the earlier tables because data required for Lag-
Incentive from two fiscal years before the SEO are unavailable for a number of SEO firms. Number of observations (NOBS) 
used in the estimation and the adjusted R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. 






  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive   1.07 0.06   1.07 0.05 
Sales -0.01 0.80 0.63 0.08 -0.01 0.86 0.58 0.14 
MB 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.88 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.83 
Cash 0.10 0.81 -1.48 0.70 0.09 0.83 -1.44 0.72 
Leverage -0.02 0.95 0.32 0.88 0.04 0.92 0.01 0.99 
Secondary 0.15 0.17 -1.73 0.12 0.15 0.18 -1.94 0.09 
Past-Ret 0.27 0.02 0.17 0.88 0.27 0.03 -0.14 0.91 
Residual Std Dev 0.83 0.34 0.07 0.97 0.81 0.36 -0.08 0.97 
Div-Const -0.04 0.83   -0.02 0.91   
R&D 0.05 0.94   0.27 0.75   
NOL -0.05 0.62   -0.06 0.59   
Cash-Flow 0.11 0.84   0.32 0.68   
Lag-Incentive 0.68 0.00   0.67 0.00   
Volatility -1.25 0.17   -1.20 0.19   
Pr/MV     -0.07 0.55 1.72 0.07 
Accrual     0.43 0.63 0.75 0.88 
Analyst     -0.03 0.70 0.39 0.60 
NOBS 345   345   345   345   
R2 69.57%   17.71%   68.83%   18.10%   
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Table IX (Continued…) 
 
Panel B: Deviation Model       
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive-Dev 0.62 0.06 0.64 0.05 
Sales 0.39 0.20 0.46 0.16 
MB 0.12 0.41 0.15 0.31 
Cash 0.44 0.87 0.80 0.77 
Leverage 1.04 0.61 0.83 0.69 
Secondary -2.15 0.02 -2.20 0.02 
Past-Ret 0.59 0.38 0.74 0.33 
Residual Std Dev -1.41 0.26 -1.98 0.13 
Pr/MV   1.14 0.43 
Accrual   -2.60 0.25 
Analyst   -0.17 0.76 
NOBS 457   457   





 51  
 
Table X: Operating Performance Measures for Four Equity-Incentive Groups 
 
This table presents the median operating performance measures for incentive group firms by quartile and for years -1, 0 and 
+1 relative to the fiscal year for which equity incentive is measured. ROA measures the return on assets and is computed by 
dividing the net income of the firm (without extraordinary incomes) by total assets. EBIDTA/Sales measures the operating 
profit margin. Sales/Asset measures the firm’s asset turnover ratio. All numbers are adjusted (differenced) for the industry 
median based on 2-digit SIC codes.  
 
  ROA EBIDTA/Sales Sales/Asset 
Panel A: One Year Before Equity Incentive is Measured 
Q1 (Lowest Incentive) 0.0032 0.0192 -0.0939 
Q2 0.0153 0.0456 0.0088 
Q3 0.0287 0.0687 -0.0355 
Q4 (Highest Incentive) 0.0501 0.0544 0.0616 
High-Low 0.0469*** 0.0352*** 0.1555*** 
    
Panel B: The Year Equity Incentive is Measured 
Q1 (Lowest Incentive) 0.0003 0.0288 -0.1157 
Q2 0.0099 0.0383 -0.0060 
Q3 0.0288 0.0790 -0.0304 
Q4 (Highest Incentive) 0.0568 0.0743 0.0480 
High-Low 0.0565*** 0.0455*** 0.1637*** 
    
Panel C: One Year After Equity Incentive is Measured 
Q1 (Lowest Incentive) 0.0002 0.0243 -0.0871 
Q2 0.0135 0.0517 -0.0035 
Q3 0.0340 0.0882 -0.0358 
Q4 (Highest Incentive) 0.0534 0.0873 -0.0096 
High-Low 0.0532*** 0.0630*** 0.0775** 
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Table XI. Regression Results for Three Alternative Measures of Equity Incentives 
 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted return in (-2, +2) event window surrounding the SEO announcement day. In 
Model 1, Incentive measures log of average (Delta /Total Compensation) of the top five managers of firms; i.e., we compute 
this ratio for each executive, then take the log of its mean to compute the incentive. In Model 2, Incentive measures the log of 
percentage of shares held by the top five executives of the firm. In Model 3, we divide the summed delta of top five 
executives of the firms by the sum of their salaries and bonuses and take the log of this variable. Sales represents the log 
annual sales of the firm in millions of dollars. MB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm, which is measured by (market value 
of the firm’s equity + book value of assets – book value of equity)/(book value of assets). Book value of assets and equity are 
from COMPUSTAT items 6 and 60, respectively. Cash measures the cash and marketable securities (item 1) as a percentage 
of the book value of assets. Leverage is computed by taking the ratio of long term and short term debt (item 9 + 34) divided 
by the total assets. Secondary is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO includes some secondary shares in the offering, 
zero otherwise. Past-Ret measures log (1 + return of issuing firm over the past one year), measured until the beginning of the 
issuing month. Return data is obtained from CRSP. Residual Std Dev represents the log of standard deviation of residual from 
the market-model regression using one year’s daily return observations (ending 30 days before the SEO announcement date) 
for each SEO. The table reports the coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity-corrected p-values. Number of observations 
(NOBS) used in the estimation and the adjusted R-squared are provided at the bottom of the table. All models use industry- 
and year fixed effects. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value 
Incentive 0.58 0.05 0.49 0.02 0.63 0.05 
Sales 0.39 0.20 0.56 0.07 0.32 0.30 
MB 0.04 0.78 0.11 0.46 0.00 0.99 
Cash 0.94 0.73 1.89 0.50 0.70 0.80 
Leverage 1.09 0.59 1.06 0.60 1.16 0.57 
Secondary -2.22 0.01 -2.33 0.01 -2.22 0.01 
Past-Ret 0.66 0.33 0.76 0.26 0.72 0.28 
Residual Std Dev -1.35 0.28 -1.66 0.19 -1.53 0.23 
NOBS 457   457   457   
AdjR2 3.24%   3.74%   3.22%   
 
 
